Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology by Hirose, Mariko
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2017 
Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology 
Mariko Hirose 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Hirose, Mariko, "Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy against the Dragnet Use 







VOLUME 49 SEPTEMBER 2017 NUMBER 5 
 
Article 
Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation 
of Privacy Against the Dragnet Use of Facial 
Recognition Technology 
MARIKO HIROSE 
 Our society is steadily marching towards a world in which cameras 
equipped with facial recognition technology could be used to conduct 
constant and dragnet surveillance on people as they walk down the street. 
The law, as is usual in the field of privacy and emerging technologies, is 
lagging behind—no clear set of constitutional rules constrains law 
enforcement’s use of this powerful technology, especially because the 
prevailing axiom has been that there is no right to privacy in public 
spaces. This Article challenges the axiom and argues that the dragnet, real-
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Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation 
of Privacy Against the Dragnet Use of Facial 
Recognition Technology 
MARIKO HIROSE* 
[I]t is quite possible to find solitude in public. More importantly, it is also 
true that it is not necessary to be encased in a steel and glass container in 
order to do so. . . . [O]ne of the things strangers produce in their 
interactions with one another is privacy.1  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In October 2016, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced a 
“transformational plan to reimagine New York’s bridges and tunnels for 
[the] 21st century.”2 Among over one-hundred pages of PowerPoint slides 
describing new flood protection, energy-efficient lighting, automatic 
tolling, and public art, were two that have the potential to transform, or 
even eviscerate, privacy as we know it.3 These slides described the 
installation of “state-of-the-art facial recognition software and equipment” 
at every “crossing” into New York City and at airports and transit hubs like 
Penn Station, “ultimately becoming one system-wide plan.”4 It would open 
the door to the use of dragnet, real-time facial recognition—a world in 
which the government could, without any individualized suspicion, scan 
the faces of people in public and retrieve their identifying information.  
Facial recognition has long triggered anxieties about a dystopian 
                                                                                                                          
* At the time of writing, the author was a Senior Staff Attorney at the New York Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law and New 
York University School of Law. I am grateful to Aadhithi Padmanabhan, Rashida Richardson, and Ben 
Wizner for their insight and feedback and to Professor Marcus Aldredge of Iona College for taking the 
time to guide me through existing sociology research. All views expressed here are my own.  
1 LYN H. LOFLAND, THE PUBLIC REALM: EXPLORING THE CITY’S QUINTESSENTIAL SOCIAL 
TERRITORY 88 (1998). 
2 Press Release, MTA, Governor Cuomo Announces Transformational Plan to Reimagine New 
York’s Bridges and Tunnels for 21st Century (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.mta.info/news-governor-
cuomo-bridges-and-tunnels-led-lights-open-road-tolling-automatic-tolling/2016/10/05 [perma.cc/f8HT-
BAHB]. 
3 N.Y. STATE, BUILDING TODAY FOR A BETTER TOMORROW: REIMAGINING NEW YORK’S 
CROSSINGS 25, 32, 54, 65 (2016), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/
MTACrossingsPresentation_2016.pdf. 
4 Id. at 44–45.  
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world. In the 2002 film Minority Report, Tom Cruise plays a hero in a 
world where there is no place to hide because facial recognition (and iris 
scanning technologies) allows the government to identify every person as 
they go about their daily lives. In such a world, there is no room for free 
speech, free thought, dissent, or human rights.    
Despite the deep unease at the world of prevalent facial recognition, 
we continue to inch closer to that reality without an adequate discussion of 
the consequences. Aside from Governor Cuomo’s proposal, a 2016 report 
from the Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technology identified five 
major American police departments at varying stages of interest in buying 
and using facial recognition technology that could be paired with real-time 
video surveillance.5  The documentary film “Do Not Resist,” also released 
in 2016, featured yet another type of real-time facial recognition already in 
use: in one scene, a Los Angeles police officer explains that she uses an 
automatic license plate scanner to identify wanted cars as she drives down 
the street and that she can now also use a scanner equipped with facial 
recognition technology in a similar manner.  
This is only the beginning. We already live in a world with thousands 
of closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) trained on our public movements and 
automatic license plate readers scanning the locations of our cars. New 
York City alone has a network of over 6,000 government and private 
cameras that are connected to one system—the Domain Awareness 
System—that also culls information from multiple government databases, 
automatic license plate readers, and gunshot spotters.6 The rollout of police 
body cameras in localities across the country will bring tens of thousands 
more mobile cameras to the streets.7 The future in which those cameras are 
equipped with facial recognition technology might not be in such a distant 
future.8  
The law has not yet begun to grapple with the prospect of such a 
                                                                                                                          
5 GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED 
POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 27 (2016) [hereinafter CPT REPORT], 
www.perpetuallineup.org. 
6 John J. Miller, Deputy Comm’r of Intelligence & Counterterrorism, Testimony Before the New 
York City Council Committees on Public Safety and Fire and Criminal Justice Services, New York 
City Police Department 4 (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/pr/
terrorism_preparedness_testimony_11122014.pdf [perma.cc/55PP-HXBP]; NYC, DEVELOPING THE 
NYPD’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 4–6,  http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/home/POA/pdf/
Technology.pdf [perma.cc/3RB3-GBR4]. 
7 See, e.g., Justice Department Announces $20 Million in Funding to Support Body-Worn Camera 
Pilot Program, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 1, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
announces-20-million-funding-support-body-worn-camera-pilot-program [perma.cc/D9K6-35HK] 
(announcing $20 million in funding to support body-worn camera pilot program in local and tribal law 
enforcement organizations). 
8 See, e.g., Ava Kofman, Real-Time Face Recognition Threatens to Turn Cops’ Body Cameras 
into Surveillance Machines, INTERCEPT (Mar. 22, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/22/real-time-
face-recognition-threatens-to-turn-cops-body-cameras-into-surveillance-machines/ [perma.cc/8AJW-
NJ5P].     
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future. Today, there is no comprehensive federal statute that governs the 
use of facial recognition technology in any of its forms, whether by private 
or public actors.9 No court has yet decided the constitutional rules 
governing law-enforcement uses of facial recognition technology; indeed, 
higher courts are still in the process of deciding if and how the Fourth 
Amendment applies to surveillance technologies that have now been in use 
for decades, like cell phone location tracking, prolonged video 
surveillance, and license plate readers.10 Moreover, this slowly emerging 
case law does not, at first glance, offer an obvious constitutional 
framework to apply to the use of facial recognition technology in public 
spaces, where the prevailing axiom has been that there is no right to 
privacy.11 
This Article challenges the notion that there is no right to privacy in 
public and advances an argument for why dragnet, real-time use of facial 
recognition technology violates reasonable expectations of privacy 
protected under the Fourth Amendment. By dragnet, real-time uses, I mean 
the possibility of suspicionless and surreptitious law enforcement uses of 
cameras equipped with the technology (whether stationary or mobile) that 
can be used to scan people’s faces as they go about their daily lives and to 
accurately match the faces with corresponding identifying information in 
an existing government database. The identifying information could be, for 
example, name and address combined with other information such as age, 
place of employment, immigration status, criminal record, arrest history, 
outstanding warrants and tickets, or perceived involvement in a gang.  
This Article proceeds by describing the landscape of current law-
enforcement uses of facial recognition technology and then by arguing that 
                                                                                                                          
9 Certain existing laws, like the Privacy Act, may impose certain limitations on how the 
government can collect information in federal government databases that serve as reference databases 
for facial recognition technology. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552A(a)(4) (2012); see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: FBI SHOULD BETTER ENSURE 
PRIVACY AND ACCURACY 2 (2016) [hereinafter GAO FBI REPORT], 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677098.pdf [perma.cc/3YQU-PHP7].  
10 Although the Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones that the attachment of a GPS device 
implicates the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not reach the separate and “thorny” question of 
whether long-term location monitoring separately triggers Fourth Amendment concerns. United States 
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). In 2016, petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court were filed 
on cases that raise the constitutionality of warrantless cell phone location tracking, United States v. 
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. filed, No. 16-6308 (Sept. 26, 2016); United 
States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. filed, No. 16-402 (Sept. 26, 2016), and the 
constitutionality of warrantless prolonged video surveillance, United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 
285 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2016 WL 4083077 (Dec. 5, 2016). Also in 2016, the New York  
Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York State, granted leave to hear a case challenging the 
suspicionless access to license plate databases. New York v. Bushey, 47 N.E.3d 96 (N.Y. 2016). As this 
Article is going to print, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carpenter v. United States. 
11 See Susan McCoy, Comment, O’Big Brother Where Art Thou?: The Constitutional Use of 
Facial-Recognition Technology, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.J. 471, 485 (2002) (“Facial-
recognition is based on visual surveillance, which has long been held not to fall within the scope of the 
constitution . . . . [t]herefore, facial-recognition technology does not violate privacy rights”). 
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reasonable expectations of privacy protect against its dragnet, real-time 
uses, drawing from prior legal scholarship, sociology research, and the past 
half-century of case law at the intersection of privacy and emerging 
technologies.12 As the initial section makes clear, the prevalent and 
accurate use of facial recognition technology of the type that is the focus of 
this Article is still, thankfully, hypothetical due to technical limitations. 
The intent of the Article is to advance the discussion of how the existing 
Fourth Amendment framework protects against a future use of facial 
recognition before it is too late to step away from the brave new world of 
dragnet facial recognition. 
II. THE CURRENT REALITY: INCHING TOWARDS THE DRAGNET, REAL-TIME 
USES OF FACIAL RECOGNITION 
Facial recognition technology is one of many biometric technologies, 
or technologies that “identify individuals by measuring and analyzing their 
physiological or behavioral characteristics.”13 Facial recognition 
technology comprises a camera that captures an image of an unknown 
person and an algorithm that compares the “faceprint” (or “facial 
template”) of the person in the image to those in a database of known 
people (“reference database”).14  
A. Expanding Law Enforcement Uses of Facial Recognition Technology 
Certain law-enforcement uses of facial recognition technology are 
already prevalent at both federal and local levels.15 The FBI now routinely 
uses facial recognition searches to identify individuals in the course of 
                                                                                                                          
12 This Article builds on works of other scholars, including: Laura K. Donohue, Technological 
Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 407, 415 (2012); Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth 
for Fourth Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH 430, 462–63 (2011); Wayne A. 
Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1610–11 (2012); McCoy, supra note 11, at 492–93; 
Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to 
Anonymity, 72 MISS. L. REV. 213, 312–15 (2002). 
13 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: COMMERCIAL 
USES, PRIVACY ISSUES, AND APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW 3 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/680/671764.pdf [perma.cc/U9GG-J7NS]. Other biometrics that can be used for identification 
include fingerprints, handprints, irises, voice, and gait. Id. 
14 Id.; GAO FBI Report, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
15 For example, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles uses facial recognition 
technology to identify individuals who attempt to obtain more than one identification document under 
different names. See N.Y. State, Governor Cuomo Announces 13,000 Identity Fraud Cases Investigated 
by DMV Using Facial Recognition Technology, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (Mar. 5, 2013), 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-13000-identity-fraud-cases-
investigated-dmv-using-facial-recognition [perma.cc/8N88-7HKC]. The Center on Privacy & 
Technology report discusses a number of other ways in which facial recognition technology might be 
used. See CPT REPORT, supra note 5, at 10–12 (describing how law enforcement uses facial 
recognition technology to identify individuals who have been stopped or arrested, or are being 
investigated, as well as to identify individuals using real-time video surveillance). 
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criminal investigations: between August 2011 and December 2015, the 
FBI, as part of its own investigation or at the request of a state and local 
law enforcement agency, ran over 200,000 face recognition searches.16 
According to an estimate in the Center on Privacy & Technology report, 
more than one in four of all American state and local law enforcement 
agencies can “run face recognition searches of their own databases, run 
those searches on another agency’s face recognition system, or have the 
option to access such a system.”17 
Most of these current, known law-enforcement uses of facial 
recognition technology do not involve the dragnet deployments of facial 
recognition technology that is the focus of this Article.18 This is likely due 
to technical limitations. Even uses of facial recognition technology in 
controlled environments raise significant concerns about accuracy, 
especially for women, children, and African-Americans, for whom the 
existing facial recognition algorithms are known to be less accurate.19  
Dragnet, real-time facial recognition, in which the image of the individual 
is not taken in a controlled environment, is still more inaccurate and 
ineffective because of “computational limitations, video quality, and poor 
camera angles.”20  
Nevertheless, in addition to New York State, at least five local law 
enforcement agencies—the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”), the 
West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center, the Chicago Police Department, 
South Sound 911 in Washington, and Dallas Area Rapid Transit—already 
“either claim to use real-time video surveillance [with facial recognition 
software], have bought the necessary hardware and software, or have 
expressed written interest in buying it.”21 Of these departments, the LAPD 
has already installed at least sixteen surveillance cameras that are capable 
of recognizing faces at distances of up to six-hundred feet and identifying 
individuals who are on its hot lists of “wanted criminals or ‘documented’ 
gang members.”22 
Both the demand and the supply for more and better real-time facial 
recognition technology for law-enforcement use appear to be strong. Many 
private companies already sell real-time face recognition systems, 
                                                                                                                          
16 Id. at 25. 
17 Id. 
18 See id. at 26–27 (discussing the risk levels associated with different forms of facial recognition 
technology usage in police agencies across the states). Such uses may also raise significant privacy and 
other concerns, especially depending on what reference database is used, but an analysis of these uses 
is beyond the limited scope of this Article. 
19 See id. at 53 (“The most prominent study, co-authored by an FBI expert, found that several 
leading algorithms performed worse on African Americans, women, and young adults than on 
Caucasians, men, and older people, respectively.”). 
20 Id. at 29. 
21 Id. at 27. 
22 Id. at 23. 
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including NEC, Cognitec, 3M Cogent, Safran Identity & Security, 
Dynamic Imaging, and DataWorksPlus.23 Vigilant Solutions, a company 
that sells subscriptions to its private database of automatic license plate 
reader data, also sells mobile facial recognition software for law-
enforcement use.24 Taser International, a company building police body 
cameras, plans to begin live-streaming body camera footage and using 
facial recognition.25 
Although commercial uses of real-time facial recognition are outside 
the scope of this Article, private-sector supply and demand will likely push 
to improve this technology. One company already proposed a real-time 
facial recognition application that would have allowed the wearer of 
GoogleGlass to glance at a passerby and learn the person’s name, 
occupation, and public Facebook profile information.26 Although the 
deployment of that application was delayed following public outcry, other 
companies have moved forward with marketing real-time facial 
recognition software, including software that claims to allow churches to 
track parishioners or shops to identify suspected shoplifters.27 Facebook’s 
facial recognition algorithm has been reported to be 98% accurate, more 
accurate than the FBI’s technology.28 It seems inevitable that market 
forces, both private and public, will drive improvements in real-time facial 
recognition and its pervasiveness. 
B. Ready Availability of Government-Operated Reference Databases 
While it may take some years for real-time facial recognition 
technology to improve to the point of accuracy, once society reaches that 
reality law enforcement will already have access to a number of 
government-operated reference databases that can be used as a source of 
identification information. Today, the faces of over 117 million American 
adults are enrolled in a facial recognition reference database, and this 
                                                                                                                          
23 Id. at 28–29. 
24 VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, https://vigilantsolutions.com/products/facesearch_facial_recognition 
[perma.cc/39BM-5WXY] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017). 
25 Matt Stroud, Taser Plans to Livestream Police Body Camera Footage to the Cloud by 2017, 
MOTHERBOARD (July 18, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_ca/read/taser-axon-police-body-
camera-livestream [perma.cc/V7BH-6UEA]. 
26 Natasha Singer, Never Forgetting a Face, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/technology/never-forgetting-a-face.html [perma.cc/VTM2-
YZUB]. 
  27 Robinson Meyer, Who Owns Your Face?, ATLANTIC (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/how-good-facial-recognition-technology-
government-regulation/397289/ [perma.cc/NW3B-G2EG]. 
28 Naomi Lachance, Facebook’s Facial Recognition Software Is Different from the FBI’s. Here’s 
Why, NPR (May 18, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2016/05/18/477819617/facebooks-facial-recognition-software-is-different-from-the-fbis-heres-why 
[perma.cc/N4H8-D6RN]. 
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number is growing every day.29  
One expansive reference database is the FBI’s Next Generation 
Identification-Interstate Photo System (NGI-IPS), which contains 30 
million photographs of an estimated 16.9 million individuals.30 Nearly 20% 
of those photographs are “civil,” in that they were submitted to the 
government in the course of licensing, employment, security clearances, 
military service, volunteer service, and immigration.31 The remainder are 
“criminal,” in that they were submitted by state and federal agencies as 
part of a lawful detention, arrest, or incarceration.32  
But the NGI-IPS is not the only source of photographs and 
identification information. The Department of State maintains a collection 
of photographs from the Terrorist Screening Center database of “those 
known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity,” 
which can be searched using facial recognition technology.33 Local law 
enforcement agencies maintain databases of suspected gang members, 
which often include booking photographs.34 The use of these reference 
databases, which may include information about people who have not been 
convicted of any crimes but have come to the attention of law enforcement, 
raise significant concerns about accuracy, fairness, and racial bias, 
especially as people of color will be disproportionately and unfairly 
enrolled in such databases.35 
Nor is the NGI-IPS the only source of “civil” photographs and 
identification, as a result of the expansion in government photo 
identification systems in the past half century. Drivers licensing was not 
required in all states until around 1960; now, over 87% of people over the 
                                                                                                                          
29 CPT REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. 
30 GAO FBI Report, supra note 9, at 10 n.23. 
31 See id. at 11 (“The NGI-IPS database has two categories of photos: criminal identities (photos 
submitted as part of a lawful detention, an arrest, or incarceration), and civil identities . . . . Over 80 
percent of the photos in NGI-IPS are criminal.”).  
32 Id. 
33 See id. at 16 tbl.2 (noting that the Department of State uses the “Face Recognition on Demand” 
system to search photos from the Terrorist Screening Center database). 
34 See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, THE CALGANG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 2015-130 11 
(2016), https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2015-130.pdf [perma.cc/WAR6-TCH7] (describing the 
CalGang system, which, as of 2015, had the biographical information and booking photographs of 
150,000 gang members or affiliate gang members).  
35 See, e.g., Letter from Elaine M. Howle, CPA, State Auditor, to the Governor of Cal. & 
Legislative Leaders (Aug. 11, 2016), in CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 34 (outlining audit findings 
of inaccuracies and inadequate oversight in the CalGang Criminal Intelligence System); CPT REPORT, 
supra note 5 (raising concerns about use of mug shots in reference databases, such as the inaccuracy of 
the technology, the disproportionate effects on African-Americans, and potential restriction of free 
speech); Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Watch Commander: Barack Obama’s Secret Terrorist-
Tracking System, by the Numbers, INTERCEPT (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:45 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2014/08/05/watch-commander [perma.cc/V2KG-ZCKP] (“Nearly half of the 
people on the U.S. government’s widely shared database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any 
known terrorist group . . . .”). 
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age of sixteen in the United States have a driver’s license,36 and therefore 
have registered their face, name, current address, and other personal 
information with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Similarly, only seven 
million U.S. passports were in circulation in 1989; as of 2016, over 131 
million U.S. passports were in circulation,37 reflecting the number of 
people who have registered their face, name, and nationality with the 
Department of State. 
Today, a government-issued photo ID is a necessary part of modern 
life, whether it is for driving, traveling, purchasing alcohol, entering 
government buildings, or verifying credit card purchases. While a more 
detailed legal analysis of the uses of facial recognition technology would 
require examining the specifics of the reference database used, what 
matters for this Article’s thesis is that for years now people have been 
unwittingly enrolling in government databases that could be used in the 
future with facial recognition technology.   
III. THE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY TO IDENTIFY 
PEOPLE ON THE STREETS IMPLICATES REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF 
PRIVACY 
The United States Supreme Court first rejected the axiom that privacy 
does not exist in public places in United States v. Katz.38 In Katz, the FBI 
had, without a warrant, eavesdropped on a telephone conversation of the 
defendant, Charles Katz, who had made a phone call from a public 
telephone booth partly constructed of glass.39 Because until then the Fourth 
Amendment was understood as protecting the right to privacy in property 
and prohibiting only trespass onto a constitutionally protected area such as 
a home, both parties focused their arguments on whether a public 
telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area.40 The Court, 
however, rejected that framing of the issue, holding instead that “what [a 
person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.”41 The Court found that Katz’s 
conversations were constitutionally protected under this proper framing of 
privacy interests because when he closed the door to the phone booth, he 
                                                                                                                          
36 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., Our Nation’s Highways: 2011, 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter4.cfm [perma.cc/3ZQT-X3FV] 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017).  
37 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. Passports & International Travel: 
Passport Statistics, https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/statistics.html [perma.cc/
FJV6-2RXU] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
38 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
39 Id. at 348, 352.  
40 See id. at 351 (“Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties 
have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the 
petitioner placed his calls.”). 
41 Id. at 351–52. 
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protected the contents of the conversation from “the uninvited ear,” even if 
he did not protect the fact that he had made a phone call from “the 
intruding eye.”42  
Katz established that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy interests 
beyond those that are rooted in property rights, and, despite criticism of its 
“subjective and unpredictable” approach,43 it remains the governing 
framework for evaluating such privacy interests.44 Later cases analyzing 
Katz and drawing on Justice Harlan’s concurrence in the case have 
explained that, under this approach, the Fourth Amendment protects 
legitimate or reasonable expectations of privacy where: (1) “the individual, 
by his conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy,” and (2) “the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”45  
This Katz framework, properly viewed, strongly favors Fourth 
Amendment protection against the suspicionless and surreptitious use of 
facial recognition technology. Under Katz, the appropriate constitutional 
inquiry is whether people in contemporary American society have the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in identifying information about 
themselves even as they expose their faces to public view by leaving their 
homes and walking or driving down the street. The intuitively correct 
answer is yes, and so is the answer that Katz’s two-step inquiry yields. 
A. People Maintain Subjective Expectations of Privacy in Identity Even 
While Out in Public. 
Most people today exhibit subjective and actual expectations of 
privacy in their identities even while they are out in public. In walking 
down the street, we invite “the intruding eye” of strangers to glance at or 
even examine our faces as we pass by, but we do not invite them to also 
identify us by our names and addresses, much less occupation, immigration 
status, criminal history, and other personal information. People do not walk 
around in public announcing or displaying such identifying information, or 
giving out such information in response to inquiries. We teach children not 
to speak to strangers, and especially not to give out names and addresses to 
strangers. In many places, we expect to be able to take trips to the 
pharmacy to purchase sensitive items, or private trips to the doctor’s office 
                                                                                                                          
42 Id. at 352. 
43 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (acknowledging that the Katz test, 
which asks “whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize 
as reasonable,” has often been criticized as “circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (explaining that Katz 
supplemented, but did not supplant, the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis rooted in the property-
based approach to privacy). 
45 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Katz, 
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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or the therapist’s office, or perhaps a quick trip to the grocery store in 
pajamas, with the minimal risk of being recognized and of being required 
to identify ourselves in public.46   
The Supreme Court has affirmed this subjective expectation of privacy 
in First Amendment cases protecting the right to speak anonymously, most 
recently and explicitly in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York 
v. Village of Stratton.47 There, a village ordinance required individuals to 
obtain a license if they wanted to engage in door-to-door advocacy and 
distribution of handbills.48 The court of appeals had rejected the First 
Amendment challenge to this ordinance, holding that it did not implicate 
constitutional interests in anonymous speech because a person already 
reveals their identity by appearing at someone’s doorway to engage in 
advocacy.49 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals’ 
reasoning conflicted with First Amendment precedent holding that the fact 
that speakers “revealed their physical identities” did not foreclose the 
consideration of the speakers’ “interest in maintaining their anonymity.”50  
Even though speakers who are known to the residents of the village 
revealed their identities through face-to-face advocacy, strangers did not 
lose their privacy interests in their identities by revealing their faces in 
public.51 In short, people do not lose their expectations of privacy in their 
identities by merely exposing their faces in public. 
B. The Subjective Expectations of Privacy in Identity While Out in Public 
Are Reasonable. 
This subjective expectation of privacy in identity is one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.  Although the Supreme Court itself 
has acknowledged that there is “no talisman that determines in all cases 
those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as 
                                                                                                                          
46 As discussed further below in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., the Supreme Court 
held that a state law may require a person to identify themselves when a police stops the person as a 
result of reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity. Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186–88 (2004). Short of that situation, however, a person 
cannot be compelled to identify themselves while in public. See id. at 184 (noting that when a stop is 
not based on “specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion,” the stop is impermissible) 
(citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)). 
47 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
48 See id. at 154 (“[The ordinance] provides that any canvasser who intends to go on private 
property to promote a cause must obtain a ‘Solicitation Permit’ from the office of the mayor . . . .”). 
49 Id. at 159, 166. 
50 Id. at 167. 
51 See id. (“The fact that circulators revealed their physical identities did not foreclose our 
consideration of the circulator’s interest in maintaining their anonymity. In the Village, strangers to the 
resident certainly maintain their anonymity . . . .”); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 341 (1995) (noting that the First Amendment generally protects the freedom a speaker “to 
decide whether or not to disclose his or her true identity.”). 
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reasonable,”52 cases applying Katz have identified a few factors that either 
undermine or bolster the reasonableness of subjective expectations of 
privacy. On the one hand, an expectation of privacy is unreasonable if the 
information to be protected is exposed to the public or if it has already 
been shared with third parties. On the other hand, an expectation of privacy 
is reasonable if it comports with social norms and the intention of the 
Framers of the Constitution. I evaluate the expectation of privacy in 
identity under each of these factors to illustrate that this expectation is one 
that society has generally been prepared to recognize as reasonable. 
1. Identity Is Not Exposed to the Public Because of Practical 
Obscurity 
Under Katz, an expectation of privacy is not reasonable if the 
information at issue was “knowingly expose[d] to the public.”53 The 
Supreme Court has used this reasoning to deny privacy protections to 
people’s faces and other physical characteristics that are exposed to the 
public, noting that a person cannot “reasonably expect that his face will be 
a mystery to the world.”54 The Court has also relied on this reasoning to 
deny privacy protections to visual surveillance from locations that are 
accessible to the public: thus, in California v. Ciraolo, the Court allowed 
the warrantless naked-eye inspection of the defendant’s property from 
1,000 feet in the air where private and commercial flights frequently 
travel,55 and in Florida v. Riley, it allowed the same at 400 feet where 
helicopters travel.56 The Court has also denied privacy protections to visual 
surveillance augmented by limited forms of technology: in United States v. 
Knotts, the Court permitted the warrantless use of a “beeper,” a primitive 
tracking device, to supplement naked-eye surveillance in following a car 
on public roads for a short period of time.57 Comparing the use of the 
beeper to the use of a searchlight, the Court held that “[n]othing in the 
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory 
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science 
and technology afforded them in this case.”58  
Unfortunately, this “public exposure” doctrine has been extended 
                                                                                                                          
52 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); see also Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (noting that reasonable privacy expectations need to be redefined as 
technologies continue to evolve). 
53 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
54 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding that a person does not have an 
expectation of privacy in his voice). 
55 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
56 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989). 
57 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (“[T]here is no indication that the beeper 
was used in any way to reveal information . . . that would not have been visible to the naked eye . . . .”). 
58 Id. at 282–83. 
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without adequate scrutiny to a type of technology that is similar in some 
respects to facial recognition technology—license plate look-ups and 
scanners. Using license plate look-ups and scanners, the police now have 
the capacity to retrieve identifying information about the car’s owner in 
real-time, including name, address, date of birth, and outstanding warrants 
and tickets.59 Every federal appellate court to confront the constitutionality 
of this practice has held that there is no constitutional protection against the 
suspicionless use of license plate look-ups because license plates are 
publicly displayed on a vehicle in plain view of law enforcement.60  
But, as Judge Moore noted in dissenting from United States v. Ellison, 
the Sixth Circuit decision rejecting the right to privacy against the 
suspicionless use of license plate look-ups, fixating on the feasibility of 
visual surveillance in this context “misses the crux of the issue,” not least 
because it “pays short shrift” to how the visual surveillance is used with 
information retrieved from a database.61 In license plate look-ups as in 
facial recognition technology, the information that is private is not our 
faces or “the particular combination of letters and numerals that make up 
[the] license-plate number,”62 but the aggregation of general information 
that a certain car or person was observed at a certain date, time, and place, 
with specific identifying information held in a government database.  
                                                                                                                          
59 For example, in State v. Donis, a police officer conducted a random license plate check using a 
mobile data unit that retrieved the motorist’s name, address, date of birth, and driver’s license number, 
as well as other information. State v. Donis, 723 A.2d 35, 36 (N.J. 1998). In People v. Bushey, the 
defendant claimed that an officer similarly retrieved the motorist’s name and address without any 
suspicion. See Brief of Appellant, People v. Bushey, No. 2016-00032 (N.Y. 2016).   The court in 
Bushey, however, noted that the argument that the officer may have accessed private information was 
not preserved for review and that the officer had testified that the only relevant factor that he 
discovered before stopping the defendant as that his registration was suspended due to unpaid parking 
tickets.  People v. Bushey, 2017 NY Slip Op 03560, n.2 (May 4, 2017). 
60 See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 2006) (“No argument can be 
made that a motorist seeks to keep the information on his license plate private. The very purpose of a 
license plate number . . . is to provide identifying information to law enforcement officials and 
others.”); Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[a] 
motorist has no privacy interest in her license plate number”); United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 
1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that because a license plate is on the outside of a car, it is subject 
to seizure). One state court, the New Jersey Supreme Court, recognized concerns with suspicionless 
license plate look-ups that yield identifying information and ordered modifications to the system so that 
identifying information cannot be displayed unless there is reasonable suspicion. See Donis, 723 A.2d 
at 40 (N.J. 1998) (“[T]he data displays of the [mobile data terminal]s should be reprogrammed to 
provide for a two-step process. In the first step . . . . [t]he registered owner’s personal information 
would not be displayed. If the original inquiry disclosed a basis for further police action, then the police 
officer would proceed to the second step, which would allow access to the ‘personal information’ of the 
registered owner . . . .”).  
61 Ellison, 462 F.3d at 566–67 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore frames the appropriate 
question in analyzing license plate look-ups in the following manner: “[E]ven if there is no privacy 
interest in the license-plate number per se, can the police, without any measure of heightened suspicion 
or other constraint on their discretion, conduct a search using the license-plate number to access 
information about the vehicle and its operator that may not otherwise be public or accessible by the 
police without heightened suspicion?” Id. at 567. 
62 Id. at 566. 
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This aggregate, identifying portrait of a person that facial recognition 
technology enables is not exposed to the public simply because it is 
theoretically possible for a law enforcement officer to identify a person on 
a street through the combination of visual surveillance and a manual 
review of records. In United States v. Maynard, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia rejected this notion in a case involving location 
surveillance of a car using a GPS device.63 In Maynard, the government 
had attached a GPS device to the defendant’s car without a warrant and 
monitored its whereabouts for twenty-four hours a day for a month.64 The 
court distinguished the case from Knotts because of the difference between 
the information that could be gleaned by the limited use of the beeper and 
the information that could be gleaned from GPS surveillance.65 As the 
court explained: 
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow 
someone during a single journey as he goes to the market or 
returns home from work. It is another thing entirely for that 
stranger to pick up the scent again the next day and the day 
after that, week in and week out, dogging his prey until he 
has identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores 
that make up that person's hitherto private routine.66 
The Maynard court concluded that aggregate information about a 
person’s movement for a one-month period is not actually exposed to the 
public because “the likelihood a stranger would observe all those 
movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.”67 Nor is it 
constructively exposed to the public, even if each of the individual 
movements was exposed to the public, because it would be practically 
difficult for a person to observe each of those movements and because the 
aggregate whole revealed more private information about a person—
including their habits, affiliations, and beliefs—than “any individual trip 
viewed in isolation.”68  
In coming to this conclusion, the court drew on case law from the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). The court noted that in United 
States Department of Justice v. Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of 
Press,69 the Supreme Court found a privacy interest under FOIA in “rap 
sheets” that contain people’s identifying information, including date of 
                                                                                                                          
63 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
64 Id. at 555. 
65 Id. at 556. 
66 Id. at 560. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 561–62. 
69 Id. at 561 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters’ Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 764–65 (1989)). 
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birth and physical characteristics, as well as a history of arrests, charges, 
convictions, and incarcerations in every jurisdiction around the country. 
The Court held that although each individual criminal record contained in 
the rap sheets was a public record that would be available to those who 
searched each courthouse file, county archives, and local police station in 
the country, the privacy of the aggregate summary of those records was 
protected by “practical obscurity”—that is, the practical difficulty of 
compiling the information.70 Thus people maintained a privacy interest in 
the aggregate information “located in a single clearinghouse” even where 
individual records within that clearinghouse were public.71  
The Supreme Court granted review in Maynard, which was re-named 
on appeal as United States v. Jones.72 The majority opinion in Jones 
affirmed Maynard on the alternate theory that the warrantless attachment 
of the GPS implicated the Fourth Amendment’s protection of property 
interests and did not validate or reject the Maynard court’s theory of 
privacy.73 But the five justices writing separately in Jones endorsed the 
conclusion in Maynard that location monitoring using GPS itself 
implicated the Fourth Amendment.74 Justice Alito, concurring in the 
judgment and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, found 
reasonable the expectation of privacy in one-month of the defendant’s 
movement history because of societal expectation that law enforcement 
agencies “would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly 
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a 
very long period” for most offenses.75 Justice Sotomayor, writing in 
concurrence, agreed with Justice Alito’s conclusion and echoed the 
Maynard court’s concerns about the comprehensive record of movement 
that can be gathered and revealed by GPS surveillance and the information 
it may reveal about the person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, 
and sexual associations.”76 Five justices therefore effectively endorsed the 
view that the mere possibility of visual surveillance of individual vehicular 
trips from a public location does not undermine reasonable expectations of 
privacy. 77 
                                                                                                                          
70 Reporters’ Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 762–64, 780. 
71 See id. at 764–65 (finding the congressional intent “to protect the privacy of rap-sheet subjects, 
and a concomitant recognition of the power of compilations to affect personal privacy that outstrips the 
combined power of the bits of information contained within”).  
72 132 S. Ct. 945, 948–49 (2012). 
73 Id. at 953–54. 
74 See id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, 
‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.’”); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I conclude that the lengthy monitoring that occurred in 
this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
75 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
76 Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
77 Several state courts have also adopted similar approaches to privacy in GPS cases under their 
state constitutions. See, e.g., New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (N.Y. 2009) 
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The approach of Maynard and the five justices in Jones could be 
extended to argue that the aggregate information revealed as a result of the 
use of facial recognition technology on the streets is not publicly exposed, 
even if that information is about a person’s presence in a location at one 
moment in time rather than their movement over a longer period.  First, as 
explained above, the totality of information that could be revealed when 
facial recognition is used to identify an individual on the street is not 
information that is actually exposed to the public.78 People do not walk 
around with signs announcing our identifying information. Indeed, the 
privacy interest implicated by the identification of people walking on the 
street is far greater than the interest implicated by license plate look-ups, 
because people do not, and are not required to, walk around with signs 
displaying identification information that they registered to the 
government.79 
Second, that information is not constructively exposed to the public 
because of “practical obscurity.” Without facial recognition technology 
and a clearinghouse of information, it would require a “super recognizer,” 
a person with extraordinary skill at recognizing faces in crowds, to identify 
an individual and to retrieve information about that person as they are 
walking by. Research suggests that such “super recognizers” exist and that 
at least one police department is taking advantage of their abilities in 
pursuing investigations,80 but the limited number of people with such skills 
necessarily ensures that their skills are only used for investigations that 
need them.  Facial recognition lifts the resource constraints that have 
served as a practical protection for privacy, just as the advent of GPS 
surveillance lifted the resource constraints that ensured that intrusive, 
prolonged location surveillance was employed only against the most 
serious offenders that warranted the time and attention of multiple police 
                                                                                                                          
(recognizing that GPS monitoring “yields . . . a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but 
by easy inference, of our associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a 
few—and of the pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits”); Washington v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 
217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (“In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of 
places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails and foibles.”). 
78 See supra Section III.A (providing examples of information not typically visually available to 
the public such as names, addresses, occupation, immigration status, and criminal history). 
79 In cases involving license plate look-ups, courts have noted that “[t]he very purpose of a license 
plate number, like that of a Vehicle Identification Number, is to provide identifying information to law 
enforcement officials and others.” See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 2006); 
see also People v. Bushey, 2017 NY Slip Op 03560 (rejecting any expectation of privacy against 
license plate look-ups because one of the important objectives of motor vehicle registration is to 
“facilitate the identification of the owner” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
80 See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Detectives Who Never Forget a Face, NEW YORKER (Aug. 22, 
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/22/londons-super-recognizer-police-force 
[perma.cc/95YY-Z8CE] (“In Room 901 of New Scotland Yard, the police had assembled half a dozen 
officers who shared an unusual talent: they all had a preternatural ability to recognize human faces.”).  
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officers over days and weeks.81 
Finally, the information revealed by the use of facial recognition 
clearly implicates privacy interests that are different from, and more than, 
the sum of its parts. A database of a person’s photograph, name, address, 
and other personal information on its own holds a wealth of private 
information about a person. But that information is far more valuable when 
it is combined with an image depicting the person’s presence at a protest, 
the person’s entry into a gay bar, an abortion clinic, or a mosque, or the 
person’s interactions with another identifiable person.82 That these discrete 
pieces of information may be accessible to law enforcement does not mean 
that the combination of those pieces of information is exposed to the 
public. 
2. Identity in Public Is Not Subject to the Third-Party Doctrine 
Because it Is Not Voluntarily Shared with Government Entities. 
Under Katz’s progeny, the Supreme Court has held that information 
loses its privacy protection where it is voluntarily disclosed to a third-
party. This doctrine, known as the “third-party doctrine,” developed in the 
1970s—but, as with the public exposure doctrine just discussed, should not 
apply to the use of facial recognition technology. 
In United States v. Miller, decided in 1976, the Court held that there 
was no Fourth Amendment right to privacy in bank records because these 
records “contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”83 The 
Court found that “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to 
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government.”84 This was so even if the information was shared to a third 
party “on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and 
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”85 
In following Miller in 1979, the Court further held in Smith v. 
Maryland that there was no Fourth Amendment right to privacy in 
telephone dialing records of a home line.86 The Court found that any 
subjective expectations of privacy in numbers dialed were not reasonable 
because “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information 
he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”87 In short, because a person 
voluntarily chooses to share phone dialing information with the telephone 
                                                                                                                          
81 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that GPS devices have made long-
term monitoring “relatively easy and cheap”). 
82 See New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (N.Y. 2009).  
83 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
84 Id. at 443. 
85 Id. 
86 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
87 Id. at 743–44. 
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company in making a call, the person has “assumed the risk that the 
company would reveal to the police the numbers he dialed.”88 
But the third-party doctrine does not apply to the use of facial 
recognition technology on the streets for the same reason that the public 
exposure doctrine does not apply. In Miller and Smith, the government 
sought to obtain only the limited business records that were in the 
possession of the third-party businesses pursuant to ordinary business 
practices. With facial recognition, however, law enforcement not only 
seeks access to identification records already existing in some government 
database, but seeks to dip into that database to generate new information 
that links a person’s location with the identifying information. People have 
not handed over to any third-party the aggregate information generated by 
the use of facial recognition technology— the information of where they 
are in a given moment in time combined with identifying information.89  
Moreover, that identifying information exists in a government database 
does not mean that any government agency has the right to access it for 
law-enforcement purposes.  Ferguson v. City of Charleston establishes one 
of the limitations to such access.90 In that case, a public hospital worked 
with law enforcement to set forth procedures by which the hospital staff 
would test pregnant patients suspected of drug use and refer any positive 
tests to law enforcement for arrest and prosecution.91 Even though medical 
records are prototypical of records that are always shared with third parties, 
namely doctors, the Court did not apply the third-party doctrine in that 
case.92 Instead, it held that the patients maintained a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” that the results of their diagnostic tests “will not be 
shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”93  As in Ferguson, 
when people share their identifying information with one government 
entity for a limited purpose, they do not voluntarily consent to the use of 
that information in combination with facial recognition for all future law 
enforcement purposes. 
This leads to an important point about voluntariness. Miller and Smith 
held that the expectations of privacy in those cases were unreasonable 
because the defendants voluntarily agreed to share their information with 
third-parties when they elected to use a service offered by a private 
                                                                                                                          
88 Id. at 744. 
89 In certain instances this type of information will be in the hands of the third party. If a person 
chooses to email a friend using Gmail that she is in a certain location, the government may try to access 
that information through Gmail. If a person is carrying a cell phone, the government may try to access 
location information through the cell phone provider. But these are separate questions from whether the 
third-party doctrine applies to the government attempting to access this information through the use of 
facial recognition technology. 
90 532 U.S. 67, 85–86 (2001). 
91 Id. at 70–73. 
92 See id. at 78. 
93 Id.  
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business.94 The same cannot be said for those whose pictures and personal 
information are recorded by the government in the course of criminal 
proceedings and enrolled in a government reference database—to the 
contrary, they are disclosing this information under coercion. More 
broadly, the same also cannot be said for a person’s decision to forfeit their 
private identifying information to the government in order to apply for a 
benefit that only the government can offer and that is critical to modern 
life, such as government-issued photo identification.  In a similar vein, 
some courts have rejected the notion that people voluntarily share their 
location information with their cell phone providers by their decision to 
use their cell phone because a cell phone is a modern necessity.95  
Finally, Miller and Smith were decided in such a different 
technological reality that it may no longer make sense to apply the third-
party doctrine to today’s world, as Justice Sotomayor posited in her Jones 
concurrence.96 The information that could be accumulated and analyzed 
about a person in the 1970s, whether through bank records or through 
telephone dialing records, was limited by technology and storage costs. By 
comparison, today the speed at which society produces data has 
accelerated—according to one announcement, 90% of the data in the world 
has been generated in two years.97 The Supreme Court already recognized 
in the 1970s that the “accumulation of vast amounts of personal 
                                                                                                                          
94 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“[The] petitioner had to convey [the 
dialed] number to the telephone company . . . if he wished to complete his call.”); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (“All documents obtained . . . contain only information voluntarily 
conveyed to the banks . . . .”).  
95 See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. 
Supp. 2d 113, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The fiction that the vast majority of the American population 
consents to warrantless government access to the records of a significant share of their movements by 
‘choosing’ to carry a cell phone must be rejected”); Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504, 523 (Fla. 2014) 
(rejecting the application of Miller and Smith to location records held by a cell phone provider because 
“[r]equiring a cell phone user to turn off the phone just to assure privacy from government intrusion 
that can reveal a detailed and intimate picture of the user’s life places an unreasonable burden on the 
user to forego necessary use of his cell phone, a device now considered essential by much of the 
populace”). But see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding 
that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cellphone carrier’s business records 
showing the cell tower locations of his phone calls); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding that a defendants had no reasonable expectations of privacy in historical 
cell-site location information), cert. filed, No. 16-6308 (Sept. 26, 2016); United States v. Carpenter, 
819 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Carriers necessarily track their customers’ phones across different 
cell-site sectors to connect and maintain their customers’ calls. And carriers keep records of these data 
to find weak spots in their network and to determine whether roaming charges apply, among other 
purposes. Thus, the cell-site data—like mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP addresses—are 
information that facilitate personal communications, rather than part of the content of those 
communications themselves. The government’s collection of business records containing these data 
therefore is not a search”), cert. filed, No. 16-402 (Sept. 26, 2016). 
96 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing 
doubt over the third-party doctrine given that, in the digital age, “people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks”). 
97 What is Big Data?, IBM, https://www-01.ibm.com/software/data/bigdata/what-is-big-data.html 
[perma.cc/SJ4R-47U7] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017). 
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information in computerized data banks or other massive government 
files” raises significant privacy concerns, especially when not accompanied 
by adequate protections against unwarranted disclosure.98  The massive 
databases that are possible today, and that are readily accessible by facial 
recognition technology, render the third-party doctrine of Miller and Smith 
anachronistic to the privacy threats that exist today. 
3. Social Norms Validate the Privacy in Identity. 
The previous two sections discussed factors that undermine reasonable 
expectations of privacy, but what about factors that bolster reasonableness 
of expectations in privacy? The Supreme Court has stated that expectations 
of privacy are reasonable where they are “established by general social 
norms.”99  
On the one hand, general social norms inform us to expect some level 
of intrusive behavior from others in society while we are in public spaces. 
In California v. Greenwood, the Court held that general social norms 
undermined the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy in the 
contents of garbage bags left on the streets because “[i]t is common 
knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street 
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other 
members of the public.”100 
On the other hand, society frowns on intrusive behavior in public that 
crosses a certain threshold. Thus, in Bond v. United States, the Supreme 
Court held that a law enforcement agent violated reasonable expectations 
of privacy by squeezing a bag that a traveler had stored in the overhead 
storage area of a bus.101 The Court explained that while a bus passenger 
expects that his bag may be handled, “[h]e does not expect that other 
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an 
exploratory manner.”102 Bond drew a distinction between the minimally-
intrusive surveillance that can be expected in public, such as the aerial 
surveillance in Ciraolo and Riley, and the tactile intrusion that occurred in 
the case.103 
                                                                                                                          
98 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977) (citation omitted) (rejecting challenge to a state 
prescription database, but recognizing concern regarding unwarranted disclosures of personal 
information resulting from government collection of information); see also id. at 606–07 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the 
potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not 
demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology.”). 
99 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 51 n.3 (1988) (quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 
420, 428 (1981)); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12 (1978) (stating that 
reasonableness of expectations of privacy can be rooted in “understandings that are recognized or 
permitted by society”). 
100 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (footnotes omitted). 
101 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). 
102 Id. at 338–39. 
103 See id. at 337 (“Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual 
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Lower courts have recognized that, even without the tactile intrusion of 
Bond, intensive visual surveillance in public can cross the line of socially 
acceptable norms. Some courts have therefore held that prolonged video 
surveillance of the exterior of a person’s home, even if taken from a 
lawfully accessible location, violates reasonable expectations of privacy.104 
Some state courts have held that aerial surveillance violates reasonable 
expectations where the airplane hovers above a person’s property and 
causes an intrusion into a sphere of privacy that exceeds the “brief flyover” 
visual surveillance of Ciraolo and Riley.105  
Facial recognition surveillance, like these forms of more intrusive 
surveillance, crosses the boundaries of socially acceptable behavior in 
public. Although the Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the sources 
of such norms, one place to search for norms is in sociology literature. In 
the 1970s, sociologist Erving Goffman coined the term “civil inattention” 
to describe the social rules that people follow in navigating pedestrian 
traffic in the streets.106 While walking on the streets, we constantly scan 
our surroundings, including others who are sharing the streets with us. But 
this scan is limited to a “simple body check,” a brief glance to ensure that 
the two people are not on a collision path.107 Staring at a person’s facial 
features—the non-technological equivalent to facial recognition—is 
socially unacceptable and “may be construed as an encroachment or threat 
of some kind.”108 The natural defense of those caught staring at passersby 
in public is to “enact a scan that gives the appearance of happening to fall 
upon the victim the moment he happens to look at the scanner.”109   
Goffman further explained that this level of information control over 
one’s identity is necessary to navigate the various spaces in people’s 
lives—spaces where we are likely to be known personally and spaces 
where we “can expect to remain anonymous, eventful to no one.”110 And 
while Goffman focused his analysis on those who he believed would suffer 
                                                                                                                          
inspection.”); see also supra Section III. B.1 (discussing Riley and Ciraolo). 
104 See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
prolonged video surveillance of the curtilage of the defendants’ home from a utility pole implicated the 
Fourth Amendment); Shafer v. City of Boulder, 896 F. Supp. 2d 915, 931–32 (D. Nev. 2012) 
(recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy against constant video surveillance of defendant’s 
backyard for fifty-six days). But see United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that a ten-week video surveillance of the defendant’s farm from a camera located on top of a 
public utility pole on the road did not implicate the Fourth Amendment). 
105 New Mexico v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1172 (N.M. 2015); see also, e.g., Vermont v. Bryant, 
950 A.2d 467, 480–81 (Vt. 2008) (holding the same under the Vermont State Constitution). 
106 ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 209 (1971). 
107 Id. at 12. 
108 Id. at 132. 
109 Id. at 127; see also id. at 59 (those who seek to stare at others in a fixed location must relegate 
themselves to the “few places available that are sufficiently far removed from other persons present”).  
Other scholars have written on the need for privacy in public spaces. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy 
of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 555–56 (2006) (discussing work of Irwin Altman). 
110 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 83 (1963). 
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stigma if certain personal information about themselves were revealed, he 
recognized that every person has some situation in which they will need to 
manage the disclosure of their identities.111 
Lyn H. Lofland, writing about urban public space in the 1990s, also 
noted that civil inattention “makes possible copresence without 
commingling, awareness without engrossment, courtesy without 
conversation”—and that it is “the sine qua non of city life.”112 She 
concluded that “when humans in the public realm appear to ignore one 
another, they do so not out of psychological distress but out of a ritual 
regard, and their response is not the asocial one of ‘shut down’ but the 
fully social one of politeness.”113 Society depends on the norm of 
maintaining some respectful distance from fellow humans as each person 
goes around their daily lives.  
Goffman coined the term “civil inattention” decades ago, but recent 
polls confirm that privacy in identity in public places continues to be a 
valued social norm. According to a 2015 poll conducted by Pew Research, 
over 60% of the American public believe that being able to travel in public 
without always being identified is an important societal value.114 In further 
support of this belief, 93% of those surveyed believed it important to 
maintain control of who can get information about them.115 In a separate 
Pew Research survey, 95% of those surveyed responded that their social 
security number—the ultimate identifier—was sensitive information, more 
sensitive than health records or the content of phone conversation.116  
There is widespread recognition, evident in popular culture as well as 
the media coverage on this topic, that the use of facial recognition to 
identify individuals in public will violate the prevailing norms of 
society.117 The Fourth Amendment should protect these norms of privacy 
                                                                                                                          
111 See id. at 127 (“The most fortunate of normal is likely to have his half-hidden failing, and for 
every little failing there is a social occasion when it will loom large, creating a shameful gap between 
virtual and actual social identity.”). 
112 LOFLAND, supra note 1, at 30.  
113 Id.  
114 PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS HOLD STRONG VIEWS ABOUT PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
(May 19, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-
and-surveillance/pi_15-05-20_privacysecurityattd00/ [perma.cc/8TBB-C9ZC]. 
115 Id. 
116 MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN 
THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-
perceptions/ [perma.cc/GRS3-3T53]. 
117 See, e.g., Andrew Liszewski, This Creepy Facial Recognition System Knows How Often You 
Visit a Store, GIZMODO (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5959723/this-creepy-facial-
recognition-system-knows-how-often-you-visit-a-store [https://perma.cc/7QY4-H6VDF]; Richard 
Newton, You Are Being Watched: Face Recognition Deemed ‘Creepy’ By UK Shoppers, GUARDIAN 
(July 27, 2015, 2:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/small-business-network/2015/jul/27/you-are-
being-watched-face-recognition-creepy-uk-shoppers [perma.cc/V2CD-QKM7]; Singer, supra note 26; 
Keith Wagstaff, Washington Frets Over ‘Minority Report’-Style Facial Recognition Technology, NBC 
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/washington-frets-over-minority-
report-style-facial-recognition-technology-2D11692143 [https://perma.cc/7HAU-PEDU].  
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that exist today. 
4. The Intent of the Framers of the Constitution to Prohibit 
Indiscriminate Searches, Prevent Arbitrary and Discriminate 
Intrusions, and Support Democratic Principles Validates the 
Privacy in Identity. 
Courts also look to the “intention of the framers of the Fourth 
Amendment” in determining the reasonableness of expectations of 
privacy.118 In the case of facial recognition, there is of course no explicit 
evidence of intent—it is safe to say that the Founding Fathers could not 
have imagined the world of electronic databases that exist today, much less 
the technology that can match that data with a face in real-time. But facial 
recognition impinges on several concepts that were critical to the Framers 
in crafting the Constitution, including the prohibition on general searches, 
the prevention of arbitrary and indiscriminate intrusion on privacy, and the 
preservation of a democracy. As some judges have already suggested, 
these factors should be used as guide posts in determining the 
reasonableness of expectations of privacy in the modern world.119 
i. The potential for indiscriminate searches. 
In crafting the Constitution, and in particular the Fourth Amendment, 
the Framers sought to prevent “indiscriminate searches and seizures” like 
those that were conducted under the authority of general warrants.120 
Courts have therefore noted the need to be vigilant against technologies 
that enable “dragnet-type law enforcement practices”121 and “programs of 
mass surveillance.”122 In Knotts, the Court rejected the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                          
118 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). 
119 See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., 
concurring) (rejecting Maynard’s approach to reasonable expectations of privacy but suggesting that he 
would determine the constitutionality of GPS surveillance by exploring whether there are colorable 
arguments that “the use of GPS technology to engage in long-term tracking is analogous to general 
warrants that the Fourth Amendment was designed to curtail . . . the technology’s potential to be used 
arbitrarily or because it may alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society”), rev’d, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also Jones, 
132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the “attributes of GPS monitoring” that she 
would take into account when considering the existence of reasonable expectations of privacy, 
including the potential of the technology to “evade[] the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices” and to “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
120 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (“It is familiar history that indiscriminate 
searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that 
motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 625–27 (1886) (describing the history of general warrants). 
121 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983). 
122 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting constitutional challenge 
to warrantless GPS surveillance in the case but noting that “[s]hould government someday decide to 
institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide 
whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search”). 
 2017] PUBLIC FACES, PRIVATE IDENTITIES 1615 
suggestion that beeper surveillance would permit twenty-four hour 
surveillance of any citizen in the country without judicial knowledge or 
supervision, but stated that “if such dragnet type law enforcement practices 
. . . should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”123 
That time may arrive with advanced uses of facial recognition 
technology. When facial recognition is used with real-time video 
surveillance, mass surveillance is the reality, not only a mere possibility. 
Other uses of facial recognition technology, like a mobile scanner that can 
be pointed at any person the street, also facilitate the indiscriminate uses of 
the technology because they, by their surreptitious nature, “evade[] the 
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: limited 
police resources and community hostility.”124 Given this potential for mass 
surveillance, the use of facial recognition technologies should be subject to 
some Fourth Amendment regulation.  
ii. The potential for arbitrary and discriminatory intrusion by 
the police. 
At the core of the Fourth Amendment is “[t]he security of one’s 
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police.”125 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has prohibited police officers from stopping and demanding 
identification from a person walking on the street,126 or for that matter from 
a person driving down the road,127 without suspicion because “the risk of 
arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.”128 It is only 
when officers have reasonable suspicion for stopping a person in the first 
place that the law enforcement interest in demanding to know the person’s 
name exceeds the privacy interest in one’s identity.129 
Facial recognition technology subverts these long-standing Fourth 
Amendment protections by allowing the police to discover the identities of 
anyone on the streets, and without any constitutional limitations, the 
technology will likely result in widespread abuse and misuse. A recent 
                                                                                                                          
123 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84. 
124 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
125 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that 
the Fourth Amendment is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and enforceable against the States 
under the Due Process Clause).  
126 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1979). 
127 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
128 Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661). 
129 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004) (“The 
reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined ‘by balancing its intrusion on 
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests’. . 
. .  A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent 
with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
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Associated Press report uncovered evidence of nationwide abuse and 
misuse of confidential law enforcement databases to learn private 
information about romantic partners, journalists, and others for reasons 
unrelated to law enforcement.130 An audit of law enforcement access to a 
license records database in Minnesota in 2012 found that more than half of 
the users audited had queried people with the same last name or 
disproportionately searched for people of one sex.131 In Florida, more than 
400 incidents of misuse of the state’s Driver and Vehicle Information 
Database was reported in an 18-month period starting in 2014.132   
This pattern of abuse and misuse is also likely to disproportionately 
impact communities of color. Even when well-established case law has 
required reasonable suspicion for law enforcement to stop individuals, 
people of color have been stopped disproportionately and discriminatorily 
targeted by the police.133 In a world where the police are free to direct 
surveillance technologies to anyone without any suspicion, the scrutiny is 
likely to fall on communities of color.  As Justice Sotomayor noted 
recently, “it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of 
this type of [suspicionless] scrutiny [by the police].”134 
The impact on these communities will be both psychological and 
physical. As Judge Moore noted in dissent in Ellison, the case regarding 
the suspicionless use of license plate look-ups, there is real, cognizable 
harm in “[t]he psychological invasion that results from knowing that one’s 
personal information is subject to search by the police, for no reason . . . 
.”135  This is the psychological privacy harm that Katz protects even when 
there is no intrusion on property interests.136 
But the harm of facial recognition technology will not stop at the 
                                                                                                                          
130 Sadie Gurman & Eric Tucker, AP: Across US, Police Officers Abuse Confidential Databases, 
Associated Press (Sept. 28, 2016, 12:28 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43/ap-across-us-police-officers-abuse-confidential-databases 
[perma.cc/4U8L-FJV6]. 
131 OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., EVALUATION REPORT: LAW 
ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF STATE DATABASES 25–26 (2013), http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/
ped/pedrep/ledatabase.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS7W-PYU9]; Eric Roper, Audit Finds Common Misuse 
of Minnesota Driver Data, STAR TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2013, 5:56 AM), http://www.startribune.com/feb-21-
audit-finds-common-misuse-of-minnesota-driver-data/192090631/?c=y&page=all&prepage=
1#continue [https://perma.cc/SQ79-HDL5]. 
132 Howard Altman, Misuse of Florida’s Driver Database Is Often Personal, TAMPA BAY ONLINE 
(Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.tbo.com/news/crime/misuse-of-floridas-driver-database-is-often-personal-
20160827/ [https://perma.cc/4PUX-SRL3]. 
133 See e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he City 
adopted a policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local 
crime suspect data. This has resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of blacks and 
Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Both statistical and anecdotal evidence showed 
that minorities are indeed treated differently than whites.”). 
134 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
135 United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 568 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, dissenting). 
136 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled 
to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
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psychological if the technology is used to manufacture a reason to stop and 
investigate a person—that is, if it is used not only to retrieve identifying 
information, but also information about a person’s outstanding warrants, 
tickets, or other information that will give police officers “reasonable 
suspicion” or “probable cause” to stop a person. Unfortunately, in Utah v. 
Strieff, the Supreme Court recently approved an arrest and a search 
incident to arrest that occurred after an initial illegitimate stop of the 
person turned up an outstanding warrant.137  
Strieff, however, should be limited to its facts and should not apply to 
endorse law enforcement’s suspicionless use of facial recognition 
technology. The Supreme Court’s decision in Strieff was premised on its 
belief that the suspicionless warrant check that occurred in the case was 
“an isolated instance of negligence” and therefore did not raise the specter 
of dragnet searches.138 As explained above, the government’s decision to 
allow suspicionless use of  facial recognition technology is a decision to 
allow dragnet searches of people’s identities.139 Such use of facial 
recognition would create precisely the world that Justice Sotomayor fears 
in her dissent in Strieff—a world where officers can “warrant-check 
random joggers, dog walkers, and lemonade vendors just to ensure they 
pose no threat to anyone else.”140 
Such a world would significantly alter the current balance of 
interactions between people and law enforcement. As Justice Sotomayor 
noted: 
Outstanding warrants are surprisingly common. When a 
person with a traffic ticket misses a fine payment or court 
appearance, a court will issue a warrant. When a person on 
probation drinks alcohol or breaks curfew, a court will issue 
a warrant. The States and Federal Government maintain 
databases with over 7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast 
majority of which appear to be for minor offenses. Even 
these sources may not track the “staggering” numbers of 
warrants, “ ‘drawers and drawers' ” full, that many cities 
issue for traffic violations and ordinance infractions. The 
county in this case has had a “backlog” of such warrants. The 
Department of Justice recently reported that in the town of 
Ferguson, Missouri, with a population of 21,000, 16,000 
                                                                                                                          
137 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (“We hold that the evidence . . . seized as part of [the officer’s] 
search incident to arrest is admissible because his discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the 
connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized . . . .”). 
138 Id. at 2063. 
139 See supra Section III.B.4(i). 
140 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2067 (2016) (internal citations omitted) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
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people had outstanding warrants against them.141  
With the number of outstanding warrants and tickets, which 
themselves are known to disproportionately and unfairly impact 
communities of color,142 the suspicionless use of facial recognition to 
identify person’s outstanding warrants and tickets will result in an 
exponential increase in the number of people who are subjected to “[t]he 
indignity of the [law enforcement] stop” as they go about their daily 
lives.143 These stops have serious consequences beyond the momentary 
detention, including the potential of an intrusive search and an escalating 
encounter that could result in a violent end.144 The Fourth Amendment 
needs to be interpreted to intervene against such a reality. 
iii. The potential to undermine fundamental values of 
democracy 
Finally, the Constitution exists “to safeguard fundamental values.”145 
Facial recognition has the potential to undermine those fundamental 
values, including many that are enshrined in the Bill of Rights apart from 
the Fourth Amendment. Used to monitor those engaged in free speech and 
advocacy, it may infringe on the First Amendment right to anonymous 
                                                                                                                          
141 Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
142 For example, although marijuana is used at comparable rates by whites and blacks, according 
to data from 2010, “a black person was 3.73 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession 
than a white person.” ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 9 (2013). In the report 
on the Ferguson Police Department, the U.S. Department of Justice noted the cumulative impact of 
disparate impact:  
African Americans are more likely to be searched but less likely to have 
contraband found on them; more likely to receive a citation following a stop and 
more likely to receive multiple citations at once; more likely to be arrested; more 
likely to have force used against them; more likely to have their case last longer 
and require more encounters with the municipal court; more likely to have an 
arrest warrant issued against them by the municipal court; and more likely to be 
arrested solely on the basis of an outstanding warrant. 
 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
71 (2015). 
143 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
144 See id. at 2070 (“The indignity of the stop is not limited to an officer telling you that you look 
like a criminal. The officer may next ask for your ‘consent’ to inspect your bag or purse without telling 
you that you can decline. Regardless of your answer, he may order you to stand ‘helpless, perhaps 
facing a wall with [your] hands raised.’ If the officer thinks you might be dangerous, he may then 
‘frisk’ you for weapons. . . . ‘A thorough search [may] be made of [your] arms and armpits, waistline 
and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.’ . . . For 
generations, black and brown parents have given their children ‘the talk’—instructing them never to 
run down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back 
to a stranger—all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
145 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (“What we do know is that the Framers were 
men who focused on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard 
fundamental values which would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth.”), abrogated by 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991). 
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speech.146 Used to monitor travel, it may infringe on the freedom of 
movement.147 Used to collect and disclose private information about a 
person, such as their medical conditions, it may infringe on the right to 
informational privacy.148  
More broadly, constant and dragnet facial recognition brings the 
society closer to a system of national identification, in which the 
government has the power and authority to identify and locate an 
individual at any moment. As Professor Richard Sobel has argued in the 
context of the proposal to create national identity cards, such systems 
“fundamentally contradict the bases of the American system of 
governance.”149 Identification systems “have a long history of being used 
for social control and discrimination,”150 including in slavery,151 in the 
Holocaust,152 and in Japanese-American internment.153 Such systems 
contradict American principles and freedoms and “demean[] political and 
personal identity by transforming personhood from an intrinsic quality 
inhering in individuals . . . [into] an attribute of bureaucratic and 
computerized systems.”154 As Professor Sobel concludes: “The spontaneity 
of human existence, the right to be let alone, the seclusion of privacy, and 
the pursuit of happiness need to be revered and preserved.”155 
In her Strieff dissent, Justice Sotomayor sounded in similar sentiment 
in opposing a search that resulted from an unlawful stop and warrant 
check: 
By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double 
consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black, 
guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your legal 
status at any time. . . . It implies that you are not a citizen of a 
democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to 
                                                                                                                          
146 See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 246–51 (“There is little doubt that public camera surveillance 
can infringe First Amendment values”); see also supra Section III.A. 
147 See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 262–63 (discussing case law and concluding that the case law 
“suggests that public surveillance, even when targeting actions not protected by the First Amendment, 
can infringe interests in locomotion and statis to a legally cognizable degree”). 
148 The Supreme Court has referenced, but not clarified, the concept of right to information 
privacy against the disclosure of personal information. See Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. 
Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (assuming, but not deciding, whether a constitutional right to 
informational privacy applies). However, circuit courts have recognized such a right in various 
instances. See e.g., Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing the right to 
privacy in confidentiality of one’s HIV status). 
149 Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification Systems, 
15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 319, 320 (2002). 
150 Id. at 343. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 344. 
153 Id. at 348–49. 
154 Id. at 320. 
155 Id. at 382. 
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be cataloged.156 
Dragnet use of facial recognition technology opens the door precisely 
to the cataloguing of individuals as they go about their daily lives. It is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the values of democracy.  
CONCLUSION  
In this Article, I have attempted to advance an argument against the 
suspicionless use of facial recognition technology using the Katz 
framework. There are, of course, limitations to the Article. There is more 
work to be done to refine the concept of “identity” used throughout the 
Article; more sociology and psychology research that could be consulted to 
bolster the argument for societal norms against facial recognition; more 
law to analyze depending on the precise purpose and use of the facial 
recognition technology, including the reference database used; and more 
complications to untangle in what the reasonable expectations of privacy 
mean for judicial supervision of the use of the technology and for 
suppression motions in the criminal context. There are fundamental 
questions about the limitations of the Katz framework itself, including how 
it would apply to the extent dragnet uses of facial recognition technology 
become common-place, commercially or otherwise.157  
In discussions about privacy and emerging technologies, the central 
question is whether the Fourth Amendment will continue to protect 
existing societal norms and democratic principles, or if the pace of 
technological changes will eviscerate them. I hope that this Article adds to 
the ongoing conversations about the implications of facial recognition 
technology for our democracy and privacy, particularly if they are used in 
a dragnet, suspicionless, real-time manner.   
 
 
                                                                                                                          
156 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016). 
157 In Kyllo v. United States, the Court recognized the right to privacy against the use of heat-
detection technology, but specifically noted that the government was using a device “that is not in 
general public use.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). This has left open the question of 
how the right to privacy would continue to protect people if and once certain intrusive surveillance 
technologies become available for common use. 
